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I. INTRODUCTION
“You destroy my country, I’ll kill you. And that’s a legitimate thing. If you
destroy our young children, I’ll kill you.”1
Since his assumption of the office of the President on June
30, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte has waged a bitter campaign against
suspected drug users and distributors throughout the Philippines.
State-sanctioned violence, stemming from both Filipino police and
bands of armed vigilantes, has led to the deaths of approximately
6,000 men, women, and children, as well as the arrest or surrender of
one million more.2 As the body count continues to rise, Duterte also
continues to stand in defiance of requests from leaders throughout
the international community, as well as from his own Filipino people,
to cease the bloodshed.3
This Comment will address Duterte’s antidrug campaign in
three parts. The first part will provide a brief overview of the harsh
methods, carried out by Filipino police and State-sanctioned
vigilantes in order to satisfy Duterte’s desire to cleanse his nation of
illegal drugs. This part will primarily rely upon first-hand accounts
and news reports in order to succinctly convey the suffering endured
by the Filipino people over the course of the past several months.
The second part will establish the foundation of applicable
International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”), focusing on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”)
and the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”). This part will also briefly analyze how Duterte’s methods
1
Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16,
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016
/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html.
2
Martial Law Eyed in War on Drugs, INQUIRER.NET (Jan. 156, 2016, 12:14
AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/862468/martial-law-eyed-in-war-on-drugs.
3
Full Text: Sen. Leila de Lima Privilege Speech on Drugs, Killings,
INQUIRER.NET (Aug. 2, 2016), 6:51 PM http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/802151/fulltext-leila-de-lima-privilege-speech-drugs-killings
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are in clear violation of many of these key principles of international
law.
Finally, the third part will outline several potential courses of
action that the international community can, and should, pursue in
order to end the violence in the Philippines. This part will first
explore mediation and arbitration, two of the least confrontational
methods available between Duterte and various representatives from
the international community. mediation and arbitration between
Duterte and various representatives from the international
community.
This part will then progress to a discussion of two options for
possible adjudication should mediation and arbitration fail. The first
of these options is the involvement, either through trial or through an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). The
second of these options involves the prosecution of Duterte by the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
This part, and ultimately this Comment, will then conclude by
recommending United Nations Security Council intervention under
its Article VII powers, should all alternative means of resolution
prove ineffective. While each of these proposed methods for
resolution have their own potential difficulties, as will be discussed
later in this Comment, the international community must take some
sort of action to put an end to the violence in the Philippines. Too
many Filipinos have been unjustly deprived of life and liberty for the
rest of the world to sit idly by.
II. DUTERTE’S METHODS
Like many nations around the world, the Philippines has long
struggled with the issue of drug abuse. Out of approximately one
hundred million Filipino citizens, upwards of 1.3 million are drug
users.4 This is a tremendous figure, and serves as the primary reason
Euan McKirdy, Duterte’s Crackdown: 6 Stories from the Frontlines, CNN (Sept.
3, 2016, 11:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/28/asia/philippines-voicesdrugs-war/.
4
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why Duterte based his campaign on his desire to cleanse the country
of its drug troubles.5 However, instead of bringing about an end to
the plethora of violence and untold horrors that stem from drug
abuse, Duterte has only made things significantly worse through his
open acceptance of vigilante and extrajudicial killings.
“If (a criminal) fights, and he fights to the death, you can kill
him . . . Please feel free to call us, the police, or do it yourself if you
have the gun . . . you have my support.”6 This quote, originating from
a speech given by Duterte during the beginning stages of his drug
crackdown, is a fairly representative sample of Duterte’s willingness
to encourage state-sanctioned violence towards suspected drug
abusers. Lawyers and scholars across the globe should be able to
identify this rhetoric as condoning clear violations of fundamental
principles of due process. However, what has been the actual physical
and emotional impact of Duterte’s open hostility towards drug
offenders on the people of the Philippines?
Simply stated, Duterte’s antidrug campaign has had an almost
indescribably deleterious impact on countless thousands of Filipino
citizens. Indeed, as one Filipino citizen described, Duterte’s openly
harsh stance towards drug users and abusers has led “the cops [to]
feel they can act without fear of retribution, official or otherwise.”7
This same individual was forced to stand helplessly to the side as
police forced themselves into her home in pursuit of her brother, a
drug user.8 The police placed her brother in handcuffs and proceeded
to shoot her brother in the head, execution-style, alongside three
other men.9
In addition to storming private residences, Filipino police
have also taken their violence to the streets. Suspected drug dealers
have been publicly gunned down by police, with their bodies often
5
Rodrigo Duterte Interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16,
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/
10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html.
6
McKirdy, supra note 4.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.

245

2018

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

6:1

left out in the open to rot and serve as an ominous warning to other
drug dealers in the area.10 Indeed, one of the first images to bring
Duterte’s antidrug campaign to international attention featured the
lifeless body of a suspected drug pusher cradled in the arms of his
grieving partner.11 Beside the body stood a sign stating “Drug Pusher
Huwang Tularan,” which is translated as “I am a drug pusher, don’t
emulate.”12
Besides the rampant killings, jails around the Philippines have
become inundated with inmates. For example, in September 2016,
the Quezon City jail, which was constructed to hold approximately
800 inmates, instead housed over 4,000 individuals, ranging from
teenagers to the elderly.13 Due to the overcrowding, these prisoners
have been forced to sleep in rotations, if they are even able to find
some crevice to rest their weary heads in the first place.14
From extrajudicial killings to mass incarceration, individuals
across the Philippines are terrified for the safety of themselves and
their families. Any potentially incriminating statement could very well
result in a Filipino citizen staring down the barrel of an armed
vigilante or overzealous police officer’s gun.15 After witnessing the
death of her brother at the hands of police, as was described above,
“Janie” (actual name withheld) felt little but despair. “My God,
Duterte, stop doing this . . . You don’t have the right to take the lives
of these people.”16

10
Raffy Lerma, The Story Behind the Viral Photo, INQUIRER.NET (July 31,
2016, 12:02 AM), http://opinion.inquirer.net/96101/the-story-behind-the-viralphoto.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
McKirdy, supra note 4.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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III. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Having briefly shed light upon the horrendous traumas
inflicted against the Filipino people, this Comment will now seek to
establish how Duterte’s antidrug campaign directly flouts
international law. First, this part will classify Duterte’s actions as
falling within the scope of International Human Rights Law, as
distinguished from International Humanitarian Law, and will explain
the essential differences between the two. This part will then
highlight two specific sources within the scope of International
Human Rights Law and describe how Duterte’s crackdown is in open
violation of many of its most basic precepts.
Although Duterte’s crackdown on drug users in the
Philippines has frequently been labeled a “war on drugs,” few legal
practitioners would argue that Duterte’s actions amount to a “war” or
“armed conflict” within the scope of International Humanitarian Law
(“IHL”), otherwise known as the Law of Armed Conflict
(“LOAC”).17 Under IHL, only two potential engagements can be
classified as “armed conflicts” under international law.18 The first, an
International Armed Conflict (“IAC”), only occurs between two or
more States, such as the United States’ (and a whole host of other
States’) war against Nazi Germany.19 The second, a NonInternational Armed Conflict (“NIAC”), occurs between a State and

The core of IHL is comprised of the four Geneva Conventions, as well
as Additional Protocols I and II. These treaties apply only during periods of armed
conflict, and seek to (1) mitigate the pain and suffering inflicted by opposing
armies, (2) prevent unnecessary civilian casualties, and (3) protect those individuals
who are no longer taking part in the hostilities, including prisoners of war. See The
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/genevaconventions-1949-additional-protocols. (providing an introduction to these
treaties).
18
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
19
Id.
17
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some organized group, such as the United States’ long-running battle
against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.20
Duterte’s drug campaign is neither an IAC against a foreign
State nor a NIAC against some organized drug cartel or syndicate;
rather, it is a purely internal campaign directed against individual
persons suspected of abusing or distributing drugs. Therefore, IHL
will not govern Duterte’s actions and policies regarding his
crackdown on drugs. Instead, International Human Rights Law
(“IHRL”) will serve as the legal basis for evaluating Duterte’s
conduct in the realm of international law.21
This distinction is key. Under IHL, a belligerent may, subject
to limitations imposed by the Geneva Conventions, use lethal force
to both combat enemy forces and achieve desired objectives.22
Conversely, under IHRL, lethal force may only be used when
absolutely necessary, i.e. in self-defense.23 Additionally, as will be
further discussed below, suspected criminals are entitled to a host of

Id.
Unlike IHL, which applies only during times of war, IHRL governs the
day-to-day interactions between States and their respective citizens, and serves to
guarantee individuals across the world certain fundamental and inalienable rights.
See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-internationalhuman-rights-law/index.html. (providing an introduction to the history and
development of IHRL).
22
As outlined by the Geneva Conventions, military operations under the
umbrella of IHL are governed by four basic principles: (a) proportionality, (b)
distinction, (c) necessity, and (d) unnecessary suffering. Although militaries may not
explicitly target civilians, they may legally inflict civilian casualties should they arise
from an operation that was necessary to achieving a legitimate military objective
and proportional to the importance of that objective.
23
See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, Provision 9 (“Law enforcement officials shall not use
firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting
such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event,
intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in
order to protect life.”).
20
21
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due process protections prior to deprivation of life or liberty, as
specified by several IHRL treaties and declarations.
Of those applicable IHRL sources, this Comment will
highlight key provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“Universal Declaration”) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Both sources treat due process
with utmost sanctity, something which Duterte has openly and
repeatedly failed to do in his campaign against suspected drug
criminals in the Philippines.
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration was proclaimed by the United
Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, just a few
years after the conclusion of the bloodiest and most costly war ever
waged in human history.24 The United Nations has described the
Universal Declaration as having established a “common standard of
achievements for all peoples and all nations,” as well as established,
“for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally
protected . . . “25
The Universal Declaration established several basic
guarantees of due process, which its signatory States agreed to extend
to their respective citizens. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration
states, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of
person.”26 The Universal Declaration features several other pertinent
provisions, which are listed in their entirety in the notes following
this comment.27

24
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
25
Id.
26
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.
Doc. A/777 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]: (“Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person.”).
27
Universal Declaration art. 5: (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); Universal Declaration, art.
8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution
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The Philippines has long been party to the Universal
Declaration, having helped craft the declaration in 1948.28 However,
Duterte’s antidrug campaign has repeatedly violated several of the
Universal Declaration’s most basic precepts. For example, as
described in the preceding section of this Comment, Filipino citizens
across the country have been denied access to the courts, in favor of
summary executions in homes and in the streets.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, almost twenty years after the
adoption of the Universal Declaration.29 The Philippines signed the
ICCPR on December 19, 1966, and ratified the treaty on October 23,
1986.30 The treaty is divided into several sections, which will now be
briefly described.
Part II of the ICCPR establishes the responsibilities the treaty
obligations owed by the member States.31 Part III of the ICCPR
or by law.”); Universal Declaration, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”); Universal Declaration, art. 10 (“Everyone is entitled in
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in
the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him.”); Universal Declaration, art. 11(1) (“Everyone charged with a penal offence
has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”);
Universal Declaration, art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor or
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”)
28
PHL among founding fathers of new UN Declaration on Human Rights Education
and Training, OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.officialgazette.gov
.ph/2011/03/30/phl-among-founding-fathers-of-new-un-declaration-on-humanrights-education-and-training/.
29
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
30
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner,
Philippines Ratification Status of Human Rights Treaties, http://tbinternet.o
hchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=137&Lang=EN .
31
8070, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]: Each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes:
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establishes the various due process rights guaranteed by the treaty;
those provisions most pertinent to Duterte’s antidrug campaign are
listed in the notes following this Comment.32 Part IV of the ICCPR
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities,
or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. ICCPR, art. 2(1).See also
ICCPR, art. 3 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
forth in the present Covenant.).
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
32
ICCPR art. 6(1): (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”);
ICCPR, art. 6(2) (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary
to the provisions of the present Covenant . . . This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.”); ICCPR, art. 7 (“No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”); ICCPR, art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law.”); ICCPR, art. 9(2) (“Anyone who is arrested
shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be
promptly informed of any charges against him.”); ICCPR, art. 9(3) (“Anyone
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release.”); ICCPR, art. 9(4) (“Anyone who is
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”); ICCPR, art.
9(5) (“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.”); ICCPR, art. 10(1) (“All persons deprived
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person.”); ICCPR, art. 14(1) (“All persons shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”); ICCPR, art. 14(2) (“Everyone charged with a criminal offence
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establishes a system of review of member States’ compliance with the
treaty, with pertinent provisions listed below.33

shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.”);
ICCPR, art. 14(3) (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equity: (a)
To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the
nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own
choosing; (c) To be tried without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to
pay for it; (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and so
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.”); ICCPR, art. 14(5) (“Everyone convicted of a crime
shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law.”); ICCPR, art. 17(1) (“No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”).
33
ICCPR, art. 40(1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect
to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those
rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the
States Parties concerned; . . . “); ICCPR, art. 41(1) (“A State Party to the present
Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the
effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its
obligations under the present Covenant.”); ICCPR, art. 42(1)(a) (“If a matter
referred to the Committee in accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may, with the prior
consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The good offices of the
Commission shall be made available to the States Parties concerned with a view to
an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the present
Covenant.”); ICCPR, art. 44 (“The provisions for the implementation of the
present Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the
field of human rights by or under the constituent instruments and the conventions
of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the
States Parties to the present Covenant from having recourse to other procedures
for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements
in force between them.”).
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When questioned about the brutality of his campaign,
Duterte has often emphatically stated that such violent measures,
including the potential declaration of martial law, were and are
necessary in order to combat the Philippines’ rampant drug
epidemic.34 It should be noted that this argument is not entirely
without merit; in fact, the ICCPR contains such a “public
emergency” provision in Article 4, which states:
(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law . . . 35
As many who have witnessed the effects of illicit drugs can
undoubtedly attest, illicit drugs have the potential to significantly
harm communities if left unchecked. However, despite any real or
conceived danger posed by drugs in the Philippines, Section 2 of
Article 4 of the ICCPR contains the following caveat: “No
derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and
18 may be made under this provision.”36 As discussed above,
signatories to the ICCPR recognize every person’s right to life, which
may not be deprived without adequate process. Drugs may be a
rampant issue throughout the Philippines, but that does not give
Duterte cart blanche to take the lives of thousands of individuals, as
well as imprison thousands more, without providing each and every
one of them opportunities to have their respective days in court.

Martial Law Eyed in War on Drugs, INQUIRER.NET (Jan. 15, 2016, 12:14
AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/862468/martial-law-eyed-in-war-on-drugs.
35
ICCPR, art. 4.
36
ICCPR, art. 4(2.)
34
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IV. LEGAL RECOURSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
MEDIATION, ADJUDICATION, INTERVENTION
Duterte’s actions are clear and egregious violations of the
above principles of IHRL. However, for the sake of the many
thousands of Filipinos suffering from the rampant violence and
bloodshed, it is not enough to simply recognize and acknowledge
these violations. Rather, the international community needs to take
affirmative action in order to bring Duterte’s crackdown to an end.
This action may take one of three forms: (1) arbitration and
mediation; (2) adjudication by an international court; or, in the event
that the first two options fail, (3) intervention by the UN Security
Council.
A. Mediation and Arbitration
The first course of action that should be pursued by the
international community should be some form of arbitration or
mediation with Duterte. Over the past several years, mediation, or
arbitration with a third-party arbiter, has seen a drastic increase in use
by the international community to resolve disputes between
international parties.37
The primary advantage of mediation and arbitration, and
what could potentially coerce Duterte into participating, is the
control the parties have over the process. First, unlike with traditional
courts, the parties, should they agree, will make the decision as to the
individual(s) who will hear their case. For example, in order to
incentivize Duterte to agree to arbitration, the parties may agree to
have an arbitrator from Southeast Asia. Such an arbitrator may have
direct knowledge of the Philippines’ drug problems, and thus may be
viewed by Duterte as potentially sympathetic to his cause.
Second, in addition to the parties deciding upon the
individual who will arbitrate the dispute, the parties also have
See, e.g., Gary Born and Wendy Miles, Global Trends in International
Arbitration, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, http://www.
wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pub
lication/GlobalTrends_InternationalArbitration.pdf.
37
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significant latitude in deciding which rules will apply to their case.
Again, to further incentivize Duterte to come to the negotiating table,
the parties may agree to use Filipino law to govern the dispute, or any
other law which Duterte may see as potentially advantageous to his
position.
However, in order for the parties to reap these advantages,
both parties must be willing to engage in the process. Unfortunately,
this will likely prove to be the fatal flaw for this avenue of resolution,
due to Duterte’s ardent belief in the justness and necessity of his
antidrug campaign. Indeed, time and time again the stubborn Duterte
has proclaimed the righteousness of his cause, and as such he is
unlikely to waiver from this belief.38
B. Adjudication
Should the above mediation techniques fail to bring an end to
the violence, the international community should then seek recourse
from one of two international courts: the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) or the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
1. International Court of Justice.
As established in Article 92 of the UN Charter, “The
International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations. . . .”39 It offers a forum for adjudication of a
whole host of international issues, as outlined in the Statute for the
International Court of Justice.40 Additionally, the Court will employ a
Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16,
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera /2016
/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html.
39
U.N. Charter, art. 92.
40
(1) The Jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
(2) The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of
international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
38
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host of measures in order to reach a fair decision.41 Furthermore,
only states may bring suits before the Court.42
Since its inception, the ICJ has decided several influential
cases. For example, in the Nicaragua case (referenced above), the ICJ
established several parameters for defining armed conflict.43 More
recently, the Court has passed judgment on a case between Croatia
and Serbia involving the applicability of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.44
However, before it may actually decide a case, the ICJ must
first establish its jurisdiction over the parties, which could pose a
significant issue regarding Duterte’s drug campaign. In order for the
ICJ to have jurisdiction over a case, both parties must consent to
such jurisdiction.45 Should one party refuse to recognize ICJ
jurisdiction, the Court’s decision would be stripped of its intended
impact, and thus rendered moot. So, should Duterte refuse to
constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
(3) The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain
time.
(6) In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter:
ICJ Statute].
41
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a)international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting
states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1).
42
Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. ICJ Statute, art. 34.
43
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
44
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, Feb. 3, 2015.
45
See U.N. Charter, art. 36(3) (“The declarations referred to above may be
made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or
certain states, or for a certain time.”).
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consent to ICJ jurisdiction pertaining to his drug campaign, the Court
would lack the authority necessary to issue an opinion.
In addition to this jurisdictional concern, and as stated above,
the ICJ has jurisdiction only over States, i.e. it may not exercise
jurisdiction over specific individuals. Although Duterte is the
President and leader of the Philippines, the Court may potentially not
wish to exercise jurisdiction over the entirety of the Philippines, as to
do so may seem as if the Court was indicting the entire country,
Duterte and victims alike.
As stated in Article 96 of the UN Charter, the ICJ has the
power to do more than adjudicate cases. In fact, should the ICJ fail to
secure jurisdiction through consent, or should the ICJ elect not to
assert jurisdiction over the entirety of the Filipino State, the ICJ may
instead issue an advisory opinion at the request of the General
Assembly or the Security Council.46
ICJ advisory opinions have addressed several important
international issues, including the Court’s 2004 advisory opinion
concerning the legality of an Israeli-constructed wall in Palestine.47
However, as can be easily inferred by their name, advisory opinions
are not binding. They are devoid of substantive legal impact, and a
hard man like Duterte would likely view an ICJ advisory opinion with
the same little regard as a reckless motorist views a speed limit sign
on an empty, open-country, road.
2. International Criminal Court
The ICJ is not the only international judicial body to which
the international community may turn for a resolution to the
Philippine humanitarian crisis. The ICC was created by the Rome
Statute in 2002, for the purpose of prosecuting individuals suspected

U.N. Charter, art. 96(1: )(“The General Assembly or the Security
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion
on any legal question.”).
47
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004.
46
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of perpetrating the major crimes of international criminal law.48
These crimes, which are defined by the Rome Statute, include
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.49 Over the course of its nearly fifteen years of existence,
the Court has tried several dozen cases, and currently has ten cases
under investigation.50
The ICC presents a significant advantage over the ICJ
regarding its jurisdiction. Unlike the ICJ, which may only hear
disputes between States, the ICC may only assert its authority over
individual persons.51 Therefore, the Court would be better able to
focus attention towards Duterte himself rather than the entirety of
the Philippines, provided that the Court could establish requisite
jurisdiction.
Regarding jurisdiction, the ICC would likely be able to assert
jurisdiction over Duterte for three reasons. First, the Philippines is
one of the 124 States party to the Rome Statute, having ratified the
multilateral treaty in 2011.52 Therefore, all Filipino people, including
President Duterte, fall within the umbrella of ICC jurisdiction.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter
Rome Statute], art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, available at: http://www.icccpi.int>: (“An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It
shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes on international concern, as referred to in
this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of
this Statute.)”
49
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.
Rome Statute, art. 5(1).
50
Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home.aspxhttps://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home
.aspx (listing the current situations that are under investigation).
51
Rome Statute, art. 1.
52
Philippines Ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=39416#.WJ0WpvkrI2w.
48

258

2018

Vigilante "Justice"

6:1

Second, the actions committed by Philippine police and
vigilantes, pursuant to Duterte’s dictates, can arguably constitute
crimes against humanity, which the ICC defines as “serious violations
committed as part of a large-scale attack against any civilian
population.”53 According to the Rome Statute, there are several forms
of “crimes against humanity,” which include: murder, imprisonment,
torture, and enforced disappearance.54 The Duterte regime has
employed such acts throughout the country, as part of a systematic
attempt to eradicate drug use and distribution.
Third, it is unlikely that a national court would be able to
effectively adjudicate a case of this magnitude. As established by the
Rome Statute, the ICC has only secondary jurisdiction, meaning that
the Court may only exercise its jurisdiction if a national court is
unable or unwilling to adjudicate the case.55 As Duterte is the head of
the Filipino government, a Filipino court would likely be hardpressed to successfully hear a case against him concerning his grave
affronts of international human rights law. Additionally, as Duterte’s
antidrug campaign is largely a domestic affair, another country’s
domestic courts would likely also exhibit great difficulty in securing
the firebrand leader’s presence within its courts.
Despite the ICC’s potential ability to exercise jurisdiction
over Duterte, there are two problems associated with the Court’s
potential action. First, the ICC has no actual authority or ability to
carry out sentences.56 Rather, the Court is wholly reliant upon the
How the Court Works, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legal
Process (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
54
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (i) Enforced disappearance of
persons; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. Rome Statute,
art. 7(1).
55
Rome Statute, art. 1.
56
Upon rendering a guilty verdict, the ICC may, under the Rome Statute,
institute a number of potential punishments, including prison sentences, fines, and
53
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international community to enforce its judgments. Therefore, while
the ICC may find Duterte guilty of committing crimes against
humanity, enforcement of the Court’s decision and sentence is wholly
dependent upon either (a) Duterte’s willing cooperation, which is
incredibly unlikely, or (b) the international community’s willingness
to enforce the Court’s decision through potentially violent means.
A second, and perhaps more important, concern is that it
remains to be seen how long the Philippines will continue to remain
party to the Rome Statute. On 16 November 2016, Russian President
Vladimir Putin officially withdrew his country’s support of the Rome
Statute, placing Russia outside the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction.57
Duterte may very well follow Russia’s path, and also elect to
withdraw the Philippines from ICC jurisdiction, thus placing him
outside of the Court’s ability to exercise its prosecution powers.58
C. Intervention
Ultimately, should arbitration, mediation, and adjudication
each fail to effectively put an end to the rampant violence plaguing
the Philippines, the UN Security Council should seek to take a
proactive role in ending Duterte’s campaign. First, this section will
briefly discuss the principle of non-intervention, and how it should
not apply to Duterte’s actions. Next, this section will establish the
Security Council’s authority to act, pursuant to the Charter of the
United Nations. Finally, this section will explore possible avenues of
Security Council action.

property forfeitures. See Rome Statute, art. 77. However, in order to carry out such
punishments, the ICC is wholly dependent on the cooperation of Rome Statute
member States. See, e.g., Rome Statute, art. 1(a) (“A sentence of imprisonment shall
be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have
indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.”).
57
See Ivan Nechepurenko and Nick Cumming-Bruce, Russia Cuts Ties with
International Criminal Court, Calling It ‘One Sided’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 16,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/world/europe/russia-withdrawsfrom-international-criminal-court-calling-it-one-sided.html.
58
Neil Jerome Morales and Stephanie van den Berg, Philippines’ Duterte says
may fallow Russia’s withdrawal from ‘useless’ ICC, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2016, 11:54 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-icc-idUSKBN13C0GS.
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The international community has long recognized the
principle of non-intervention, which frowns upon any effort by a
State to compromise the sovereignty of another State. This principle
was codified in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter,
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.59
Based on the principle of non-intervention, Duterte would
doubtlessly argue that the Philippines’ drug problem is “essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction” of the country. Therefore, Duterte
should be able to employ whatever methods he sees fit to combat the
nation’s drug epidemic, free from international interference. Indeed,
as discussed above, the essentially domestic nature of Duterte’s drug
campaign could prevent another State’s courts from exercising
jurisdiction to hear a case concerning Duterte’s human rights abuses.
However, the language in Article 2 does not preclude the
involvement of the Security Council, despite the domestic nature of
the incident. The procedures which govern potential Security Council
involvement are listed within Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As
stated in Article 39 of Chapter VII:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.60
President Duterte’s war on drugs constitutes both a threat to
and a breach of the peace as outlined in this article. Since his
59
60

U.N. Charter, art. 2.
U.N. Charter, art. 39.
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assumption of the presidency, countless thousands of Philippine
citizens have suffered at the hands of an overzealous police state. In
addition, such rampant violence could potentially endanger
international travelers coming to the Philippines. Furthermore,
Duterte’s campaign could potentially influence other leaders in the
region to begin their own violent campaigns against drugs.61
In sum, the Security Council arguably has the authority under
the Charter of the United Nations to initiate measures against
Duterte. Furthermore, the Security Council has a wide latitude of
potential options when determining how to best achieve peace. First,
the Security Council may elect to employ nonviolent means, such as
economic sanctions and communications interruptions, in order to
secure stability in the country. Specifically, Article 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.62
Furthermore, the Security Council’s potential measures are
not limited to these relatively peaceful measures. In fact, the Security
Council has the discretion to authorize other UN member States to
use military force to secure the peace. Specifically, Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Indonesian Anti-drugs Chief Supports Implementing Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippinestyle Drug War, ABC News (Sept. 7, 2016, 3:37 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news
/2016-09-08/indonesian-official-wants-philippine-style-drug-war/7824696.
62
U.N. Charter, art. 41.
61
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Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.63
In 2011, the Security Council intervened in Libya regarding a
situation that was also arguably an internal matter. In response to the
many injustices inflicted upon the Libyan people at the hands of
notorious despot Muammar Gaddafi, the Security Council elected to
enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and permitted U.N.
member states, namely the United States, to participate in strategic
bombing campaigns of Libyan military targets.64 Although Libya
continues to face instability, Security Council involvement did
ultimately result in the death of Gaddafi in the Libyan city of Sirte on
October 20, 2011.65
However, Security Council action could pose several
significant potential problems. First and foremost, in order for the
Security Council to be able to take action, it must receive consent,
either explicitly or implicitly through abstention, from each of the
permanent five members: the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China.66 Each of these five countries wields veto
power, and could unilaterally impede Security Council operations
should they choose to exercise that power.67

U.N. Charter, art. 42.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, S.C. Res. 1973, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
65
Martin Asser, The Muammar Gaddafi Story, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12688033.
66
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen members of the United
Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States
of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. U.N. Charter, art.
23(1).
67
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. U.N.
Charter, art. 27(3).
63
64
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While the first three listed countries may be more receptive to
possible Security Council action regarding the Philippines, China
would likely oppose any potential Security Council interference with
its newly-budding relationship with Duterte and the Philippines.68
Additionally, as the Philippines lies relatively close to the Chinese
mainland, Chinese officials would likely view potential military
operations as a possible threat towards Chinese interests and Chinese
sovereignty.69 Again, a Chinese veto would, as outlined in the U.N.
Charter, essentially strip the Security Council of its ability to intervene
on behalf of the embattled people of the Philippines.
Additionally, members of the international community would
need to consider a potential Philippine military response towards acts
which could be perceived as attacks on Philippine sovereignty. By his
very nature, Duterte would likely not submissively accept
intervention by the international community; more likely, Duterte
would actively combat any attempt by foreign States to intervene in
the Philippines, thus leading to greater suffering by the Filipino
people. Additionally, should one State attempt to unilaterally use
force to stop Duterte’s drug campaign, Duterte would likely invoke
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as a legal basis for using deadly force
in self-defense.70

68
For an insight into the Philippines’ shifting of loyalties away from the
United States and towards China, see, for example, Ben Blanchard, Duterte Aligns
Philippines with China, Says U.S. Has Lost, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2016, 7:39 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS.
69
As demonstrated by its current hostility towards any outside interference
in the South China Sea, China is notoriously protective of its national interests and
its borders. For an overview of China’s role in the South China Sea dispute, see, e.g.,
Howard W. French, What’s Behind Beijing’s Drive to Control the South China Sea?, THE
GUARDIAN (July 28, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015
/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan.
70
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
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Despite all of these concerns, it would behoove the Security
Council to at least attempt to take action. Too many lives and
liberties are at stake for the member States to simply sweep Duterte’s
lawless actions under the rug. Although this Author is admittedly
ignorant of the optimal Security Council action necessary to stop
further violence, those individuals from the Security Council’s
member States with requisite experience should be called on to craft
a workable solution.
V. CONCLUSION
“Double your efforts. Triple them, if need be. We will not
stop until the last drug lord, the last financier, and the last pusher
have surrendered or put behind bars -- or below the ground, if they
so wish[.]”71 Over the last excruciating days, weeks, and months this
harsh rhetoric, uttered by Duterte during his State of the Nation
address on July 25, 2016, has served as the impetus for incredible
violence committed by the Philippine state towards thousands of its
citizens.
Drugs are undoubtedly a scourge. They strip the body of its
health, as well as the mind of its cognitive function. Drugs tear
families apart, and are the cause of a significant percentage of the
world’s violent crime. The people of the Philippines have
undoubtedly experienced the many deleterious effects associated with
the abuse of drugs. However, despite President Duterte’s ardent
beliefs to the contrary, the answer to this dilemma is not to confront
one human tragedy with another.
As outlined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the ICCPR, every individual is entitled to the basic precepts of
due process, including a right to not be summarily shot in the streets
by roving gangs of police and vigilantes. When those due process
rights are unilaterally denied by an overzealous executive, it is the
duty of the international community to respond in such a way as to
necessary in order to maintain or restore the international peace and security. U.N.
Charter, art. 51.
71
McKirdy, supra note 4.
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cease the violations, and bring about the restoration of those rights.
The first step in this process should be an attempt to arbitrate or
mediate with Duterte, through means which may coerce Duterte into
sitting at the table.
Should this measure fail, the international community should
next seek to adjudicate the matter before the ICJ, which has the
authority under the UN Charter to both adjudicate against Duterte’s
actions as well as issue an advisory opinion detailing how Duterte is
in the wrong. Additionally, the international community may also
seek to adjudicate Duterte’s crimes against humanity before the ICC.
Finally, should mediation, arbitration, and adjudication fail to
achieve peace, the Security Council should intervene against
Duterte’s antidrug campaign. In the case of the Philippines, the
Security Council should seek, through means specified in the Charter
of the United Nations, to put an end to the suffering of untold
thousands of Filipinos, who have watched their loved ones be
brutally gunned down in the streets and locked away in filthy,
overcrowding jail cells. The violence in the Philippines is a human
tragedy that continues to escalate, and Duterte must be stopped
before more lives can be irreparably harmed by his naked aggression
and wanton disregard for fundamental precepts of international law.
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